This paper briefly reviews new indices of trade restrictiveness and trade facilitation that have been developed at the World Bank. The paper also compares the trade impact of different types of trade restrictions applied at the border with the effects of domestic policies that affect trade costs. Based on a gravity regression framework, the analysis suggests that tariffs and nontariff measures continue to be a significant source of trade restrictiveness for low-income countries despite preferential access programs. This is because the value of trade preferences is quite limited: a new measure of This paper-a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to to assess the impacts of trade costs and border policies on the trade performance of developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at bhoekman@ worldbank.org and alessandro.nicita@unctad.org. the relative preference margin developed in the paper reveals that this is very low for most country-pairs. Most countries with very good (duty-free) access to a market generally have competitors that have the same degree of access. The empirical analysis suggests that measures to improve logistics performance and facilitate trade are likely to have the greatest positive effects in expanding developing country trade, increasing the trade impacts of lowering remaining border barriers by a factor of two or more.
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Introduction
The trade policy literature has for many years emphasized the importance of taking into account the impact of nontariff measures (NTMs) in addition to tariffs -see, e.g., Deardorff and Stern (1998) . Recent research on trade and development has emphasized the magnitude of the trade costs associated with administrative red tape and entry barriers, informed by the emergence of new datasets such as the OECD's Product Market regulation database, the World Bank's "Doing Business" indicators and Logistics Performance Index (LPI), as well as firm-level surveys of the prevailing investment climate and business environment.
In this paper we review prevailing trade policies and assess their impacts on developing country trade. The objective is to compare the impact of border barriers (tariffs, adjusted for bilateral preferences, and NTMs) with other sources of trade costs.
We limit attention to the impacts of policies as opposed to the cost raising effects of differences in infrastructure quality, as our interest is to explore the relative impacts on trade volumes of different sources of policy-induced trade costs.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 summarizes the current pattern of tariff protection and the aggregate of all NTMs captured in the UNCTAD database (WITS). Section 2 discusses how we take into account the extensive system of preferential trade that has been put in place by OECD countries as well as the numerous preferential trade agreements concluded between subsets of WTO members. Section 3 discusses some of the components of the aggregate NTM measure, as well as regulatory policies not included in the NTM database: the "trading across borders" component of the World Bank's Doing Business report, and the Logistics Performance Index. Section 4 presents the results of an empirical assessment of the relative trade impacts of alternative types of policies and the possible trade effects of convergence by developing countries to the average levels of border protection and trade facilitation performance levels prevailing in middle-income countries. Section 5 concludes.
Trade Policies
Ad valorem tariffs are the most widely used policy instruments to restrict trade, with specific duties -taxes that are levied on units (kilograms, liters, alcohol content, etc.) rather than on import values -often used for agricultural products. Statutory tariffs may be complemented by ad-hoc surcharges and surtaxes on a temporary basis, e.g., to cover budget deficits or to protect specific domestic industries.
The use of NTMs has been increasing both in terms of the number of products covered and the number of countries utilizing them. NTMs include quantitative restrictions, technical product regulations, anti-dumping and countervailing measures and discretionary licensing. Although some of these measures, such as product standards, are not necessarily protectionist in intent -indeed, often they will not be -they all affect the cost of trading and thus affect trade volumes. NTMs are more prevalent in high and middle income countries which tend to have lower ad valorem average tariffs (Figure 1 ).
In this paper we use two indices of trade restrictiveness: the tariff trade restrictiveness index (TTRI) and the overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI) (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2008a; World Bank and IMF, 2008) . Both the TTRI and the OTRI are a measure of the uniform tariff equivalent implied by observed trade policies affecting a country's imports -that is, they represent the ad-valorem tariff that would be needed to generate the observed level of trade. The difference between the TTRI and OTRI is that the OTRI includes the effect of both tariff and NTMs, while the TTRI captures only tariffs, both ad valorem and the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. These indices are superior to more commonly used indicators such as average tariffs or NTM frequency and coverage ratios as they take into account the elasticity of import demand with respect to prices. In calculating the indices more weight is given to products for which demand is more responsive to changes in prices (so that smaller movements in prices produce larger shifts in imports).
The prevailing average TTRI and OTRI across countries is plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Trade policies are generally more restrictive in lower-income countries, reflecting both lower tariffs in higher-income economies and the fact that their imports are highly skewed toward manufactures, which face relatively low barriers. 1 The inclusion of NTMs in the OTRI is done through estimation of ad-valorem tariff equivalents. Both the TTR and the OTRI provide a measure of the uniform tariff equivalent of observed policies that is needed to generate the observed level of trade for a country. See Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008a) for details. 
Market Access and the Effect of Trade Preferences
The effect of trade policies on exporters' access to markets differs across trading partners and geographic regions. The average restrictiveness that exporters face in a particular market depends not just on tariffs and NTMs but on the composition of exports and the extent and incidence of preferential access regimes. Table 2 reports levels of restrictiveness from a market access perspective, using the market access versions of the TTRI and the OTRI. These measure the restrictiveness of policies confronting exporters from in each geographic region and country group. Upper middle income countries generally enjoy better market access in both developing and developed countries. This is largely due to the composition of exports from these countries, which are skewed toward manufacturing. Low income countries face more restrictive market access conditions because their exports are more biased toward agriculture. Across developing country regions, South Asia faces the most restrictive market access, due to export composition (agriculture, textiles and apparel) and because it has relatively limited preferential access. Sub-Saharan countries have the best market access, especially in high income countries, reflecting again export composition (minerals, primary products, plantation agriculture), as well as low or zero tariffs in many high income countries. By far the highest levels of market access barriers apply to SouthSouth trade flows. Sub-Saharan African countries confront TTRIs and OTRIs in lowincome countries that are 3 to 4 times higher than those that apply in middle-and highincome markets.
Comparing the MA-TTRI and the MA-OTRI suggests that NTMs are generally more important in restricting trade than tariffs: their measured ad-valorem equivalent is much higher than existing tariffs. Standards, licensing and similar regulatory instruments typically affect all products entering a market regardless of their origin, so that the impact of NTMs is relatively similar across trading partners. Tariffs, conversely, are generally negotiated on a bilateral basis, thus giving some trading partners a substantial advantage in market access. With the increase in reciprocal and nonreciprocal preferential agreements, almost all trade flows today are affected by some sort of tariff preference. This is particularly true for high-income countries, where market access is affected by increasing number of such agreements.
The proliferation of preferential trade arrangements makes it important to properly measure the preferential margins confronting countries in assessing the relative market access conditions confronting exporters. This is done in the TTRI and OTRI in a direct way, as the calculations take into account the bilateral market access conditions that apply. But what matters for a given country, however, is the relative preference (the relative market access conditions), not just the absolute level of prevailing barriers at the border.
Commonly used measures of preference margins compare the preferential tariff to the MFN rate. This will overestimate the relative preference enjoyed by countries as in most instances other countries will also have preferential access. In practice it is possible that preferential rates granted to a particular country, although lower than MFN, still penalize it relative to other countries that benefit from an even lower or zero tariffs. To calculate the relative preferential margin the focus needs to be on the average advantagein tariff percentage points -that a given basket of goods enjoys when exported from country A as compared to when it originates in other countries.
To clarify with an example, in what follows we calculate the relative preferential margin that Mexico enjoys in the US by using as the counterfactual the average tariff for Mexico's export bundle if this were to originate in other countries. The relative preferential margin is the difference between the bilateral trade-weighted preferential tariff imposed by the US on Mexico and that counterfactual. There are two set of weights when calculating this margin: first, the counterfactual, which is a weighted average of tariffs imposed on all other (potential) exporters to the US; and second, the preferential margin, which is an average constructed across many tariff lines.
To measure the counterfactual, we first calculate the trade-weighted average tariff at the tariff line level that an importer (the US) imposes on all other countries except the country for which the preferential margin is calculated (Mexico). This is done by using (US) bilateral imports as weights, so as to take into account the supply capacity of (US) trading partners. We then aggregate across tariff lines using (Mexican) exports (to the US) to take care of differences in product composition across partners.
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A simpler alternative measure would be to compare the (US) import weighted average tariff imposed on a country (Mexico) with that imposed on all other countries.
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This approach uses total imports (by the US) at the HS 6 digit level as weights. A problem with this method is that it disregards product composition: if Mexico's export bundle to the US is not representative of the composition of US imports (e.g., Mexican exports to the US are mainly agricultural, while US imports mainly manufacturing), using exclusively US imports as weights in the calculation of the counterfactual would likely lead to biased results.
5
A further complication arises in the aggregation across tariff lines. A proper aggregation would take into account that imports of some goods are more responsive to changes in prices than others. In theory, imports that are less sensitive to prices (inelastic)
should be given less weight as tariffs change -as they would have little effect on overall volumes of trade. 6 To correct for this, HS six digit product lines are aggregated using the import demand elasticities. The relative preferential margin for exports from country j is then calculated as: This measure of preference margin can be positive or negative, depending on the advantage or disadvantage of the country with respect to other exporters. Table 3 Latin America both enjoys and provides a substantial preferential margin to the USA and Canada, reflecting trade agreements with the US and within the region (MERCOSUR, etc.). This is mirrored by the negative preference that countries outside Latin America face when they export to that region. Country-specific estimates of the relative preference margin for a number of SubSaharan countries are reported in Table 4 . Bilateral preferences are significant in only a few cases, and in a few instances they actually negative, putting the countries concerned in a situation similar to that applying to East Asian economies. Only Madagascar has significant preferential margins -greater than 2 percentage points -in more than two markets. Most countries have meaningful preferential margins in only one or two markets, and many do not have margins that meet the 2 percentage point threshold.
Taking into account that the empirical literature on the 'tariff equivalent' of rules of origin finds that these average some 3 to 4 percent, these calculations suggest that the value of preferential programs is quite limited. 
Complementing NTMs with Other Trade Costs
The foregoing discussion of the trade restrictiveness of policies illustrates that NTMs are the major source of barriers to trade but that tariffs also remain important, especially in Table 5 reports the average of these indices by income country groups.
Developing countries generally have weaker trade facilitation performance than higherincome economies. 
An Empirical Assessment
In this section we use a gravity model framework to assess the impacts of border barriers Recent studies find that domestic institutions and infrastructure determine volumes of trade across countries (Limão and Venables, 2001; Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki, 2003; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Francois and Manchin, 2007) . In general, the literature supports the hypothesis that domestic trade costs and the economic environment are significant determinants of the volume of trade between countries. What follows builds on the existing literature using gravity models to investigate the importance of trade and related regulatory policies on trade flows. In addition to the TTRI and the NTM component of the OTRI (defined as the difference between the OTRI and the TTRI), we use the three indicators discussed above.
To capture the effect of traditional trade policies we use the TTRI and the difference between the OTRI and the TTRI (which captures the effect of NTMs). As this is calculated at the bilateral level, this will also soak up any variance due to the presence of preferential trade agreements. 8 We use a traditional cross-section gravity model that includes time invariant trade impediments (distance, adjacency, common language, access to the sea) as well as trade policy and regulatory/trade cost variables. The multilateral resistance term (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003 ) is proxied by "remoteness" variables following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) . This methodology produces consistent estimates and, contrary to using country fixed effects, allows the estimation of the effect of domestic factors such as logistics and red tape. The gravity equation is estimated using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML). This produces consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and is more robust to truncation Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. To capture the effect of preferences, in the last two columns the TTRI is computed as the MFN tariff-based TTRI rather than the preferential tariff-based TTRI.
Other A final specification is estimated using the trade facilitation index. This index captures issues related to the quality of the transport infrastructure, customs, and contract enforcement. Data for this index are collected for a smaller number of countries, thus reducing the number of observations substantially. Although the difference in sample size implies the results cannot be properly compared, the picture that emerges is similar to that obtained from using the LPI and the Doing Business indicators: the quality of the prevailing regulatory environment matters for trade performance.
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To assess the relative impacts of internal trade costs and the trade-impeding effect of border trade policies, Table 7 reports the predicted effect on trade if low-income countries were to converge to a set of policies that would generate the observed average levels of the various indicators in middle-income countries (as reported in Table 5 ).
These results are compared with the average effect of an increase of 1 percentage point in relative preferential access to global markets (not just the OECD) and with a reduction in the TTRI and OTRI to 5 and 10 percent, respectively. The In general terms, these results indicate that administrative and regulatory policies are at least as important as trade policies in impeding trade. This supports the recent focus of many developing countries on taking action to facilitate trade. A key question for policymakers is of course how performance can be increased on the measures used above. This requires country-specific analysis.
Concluding Remarks
The focus of policy debates and international cooperation is more and more on regulatory policies. In this paper we have investigated the impact of a subset of such policies that directly affect trade costs, including traditional trade policies. The latter continue to be important in developing countries as well as for some sectors in high-income countries (agriculture in particular). This raises the question of which set of policies is more important as a trade impediment. The analysis in this paper suggests that the impact of reducing the costs associated with policies that increase transactions costs at and behind the border will have a greater payoff than further reductions in tariffs and NTMs, or seeking additional trade preferences. Our results also indicate that focusing attention on the policies that underpin the logistics and trade facilitation indices will have a bigger impact than actions to reduce the costs of the procedures that are captured by the Doing Business "cost of trading" variable. While suggestive, further work is needed to "unpack" these findings.
The analysis also makes clear that there are still large gains from trade to be had from traditional trade liberalization -which is the focus of the ongoing Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Progress in the Round has unfortunately been slow. Bringing the Doha Round to a successful conclusion is important as it would imply improvements in market access to all export markets. Trade facilitation does not require multilateral (or bilateral) negotiations -the costs that are incurred by traders in developing countries can and should be reduced through unilateral actions. The analysis in this paper strongly supports the argument made by Ikenson (2008) that there is great scope to enhance growth opportunities "while Doha sleeps."
